Over a year since the fall of the Assad regime, Syria stands at a precarious crossroads, poised between the repetition of past patterns and the potential for genuine reform. The nation faces a critical juncture, grappling with the legacy of a system that deeply entrenched economic power within a select group. Following Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham’s (HTS) takeover of Damascus in December 2024, many economic elites, who had significantly benefited from a deeply ingrained crony capitalist system under the Assad family, fled the country. Under the previous regime, Syria’s economy operated using this crony capitalist system, under which a small, interconnected class of economic elites, closely tied to the Assad family, held extensive control over the nation's financial and commercial landscapes.
The transitional authorities have adopted an ad hoc approach to economic reconstruction, with decisions frequently made through secretive committees lacking transparent and accountable legal processes. This approach has raised concerns among observers regarding the potential for new forms of patronage or a lack of accountability in the rebuilding efforts. Interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa outlined two primary economic objectives for the new administration: eradicating corruption and fostering a free-market economy reliant on foreign investment for Syria's extensive rebuilding efforts. Al-Sharaa specifically targeted "illicit gains" in his statements, signaling an intent to address the wealth accumulated through illicit means under the previous government. In January 2025, interim Minister of Economy Basel Abdul Hanan clarified that, despite the focus on illicit gains, the interim government does not intend to confiscate the private funds of businesspeople who have operated legitimately within the country's economic framework. This distinction aims to reassure the business community while still pursuing accountability for past abuses.
Echoes of the Past: Crony Capitalism
The Assad regime, under both Hafez al-Assad from the 1970s and his son Bashar Al-Assad starting in 2000, systematically cultivated an elite class of businesspeople in Syria. This entrenched system ensured that business opportunities were consistently awarded based on an individual's proximity and loyalty to the regime, rather than on merit or open competition. This practice fostered a deep intertwining of political power and economic gain, creating a deeply rooted crony capitalist structure. This system allowed figures like Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of Bashar Al-Assad, to amass significant economic influence and control. At one point, Makhlouf controlled an estimated 60% of Syria's pre-war economy, illustrating the vast concentration of wealth and power within the hands of a few regime loyalists. His influence extended across various sectors, demonstrating the widespread nature of this economic model.
The extensive and often opaque ties between these business elites and the regime drew significant international attention and scrutiny. Both Rami Makhlouf and Mohammad Hamsho, another prominent businessman deeply connected to the Assad family, were designated for sanctions by the U.S. Department of the Treasury in 2008 and 2011 respectively. These designations showed the perceived entanglement of these powerful figures with the Syrian government and their role in supporting the regime's activities, including its repressive measures. The international community viewed these individuals not merely as successful entrepreneurs but as key financial pillars of the Assad state.
These Syrian business elites provided extensive and multifaceted support to the Assad regime's war efforts, which were key for its survival during a prolonged conflict. This support manifested through both direct financial contributions, providing essential funds to the government, and in-kind aid, which included logistical support, supplies, and other resources critical for sustaining military operations. For over five decades, these economic elites effectively functioned as the financial engine sustaining the Assad regime, playing a key and indispensable role in maintaining its control and ensuring its survival against internal and external pressures. Their economic power was directly leveraged to serve the political and military objectives of the ruling family.
Ad Hoc Deals and Opaque Processes
The transitional government’s approach to economic reconstruction has, in some instances, mirrored past patterns, characterized by ad hoc deals and opaque processes. Reports circulated that the transitional government met with several prominent businesspeople, including Mohammad Hamsho and Samer Foz, allegedly extorting them to hand over up to 80% of their assets to the state. These claims, if true, point to a continuity of coercive tactics in managing the economy, albeit under new leadership. Investment deals have largely been announced with little transparency regarding their specific contents and, crucially, the process through which project partners were selected. This lack of transparency has fueled concerns about favoritism and the potential for new forms of corruption, echoing the very issues the transitional government has pledged to eradicate.
The Assad regime had previously passed Legislative Decree 66 in 2012, concerning informal housing. While ostensibly addressing the issue of unplanned settlements, this decree was widely seen by some as a calculated tactic to demographically engineer central Damascus, displacing certain populations and facilitating lucrative real estate projects for regime loyalists. In a significant development under the transitional government, a settlement with Mohammad Hamsho was announced in January 2026, aiming to recover $800 million of his assets and funds, according to reports. This move signals an attempt to reclaim wealth accumulated under the previous regime, though the specifics of the settlement and its implementation remain subject to scrutiny.
Bilal Al-Naal, a Syrian investor and real estate developer, was alleged to have provided support to the National Defense Forces (NDF), a pro-regime militia. The NDF was responsible for the 2013 Tadamon massacre, a mass execution of 288 civilians, noting the deep and often violent connections between business interests and regime forces. Despite the change in leadership, plans for the development of Marota City and Damascus Towers are ongoing. These large-scale reconstruction projects, initiated under the Assad regime, were reportedly lucrative for elites such as Samer Foz, Mohammad Hamsho, and Mazen Tarazi, who benefited immensely from their involvement. Samer Foz and Mohammad Hamsho also developed companies involved in pillaging scrap metals from destroyed homes for resale, according to reports, further illustrating the opportunistic and exploitative nature of some business practices during the conflict. The United States issued the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, specifically targeting reconstruction efforts in Syria, aiming to prevent the Assad regime and its cronies from profiting from rebuilding efforts and to hold accountable those who enabled atrocities. This act aimed to ensure that any reconstruction would not inadvertently legitimize or enrich the perpetrators of human rights abuses.
Navigating Reform and Accountability
Rami Makhlouf, a cousin of Bashar Al-Assad, reportedly benefited from exclusive government contracts and monopolized sectors such as telecommunications, while also successfully avoiding regulation and taxes. His control over vital economic sectors allowed him to accumulate immense wealth and influence, creating significant barriers for any potential competitors. Mohammad Hamsho, another prominent businessman, reportedly held interests across nearly every Syrian economic sector, from real estate to manufacturing and trade. His extensive portfolio was complemented by his occupation of government and parliamentary roles, largely due to his close relationship with Maher al-Assad, Bashar's brother. These economic elites, closely tied to the Assad regime, were not merely beneficiaries of the system; they actively supported and facilitated its repression and mass atrocities during 13 years of armed conflict, according to reports. Their financial and logistical backing was instrumental in enabling the regime's violent suppression of dissent and its prolonged military campaigns.
The brothers Ayman, Ibraham, and Mohammad Jaber founded Suqur Al-Sahraa, also known as the Desert Falcons, a militia that participated in siege warfare during the 2016 battle for Aleppo. This direct involvement of business figures in armed conflict further notes the blurred lines between economic power, political loyalty, and military action under the Assad regime. Their actions show the extent to which economic elites were integrated into the regime's machinery of control and violence. In October 2025, Interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa issued a stern warning against what he termed "illicit gains" and, in a significant move, prohibited officials within the transitional government from participating in new investments. This directive aims to prevent the emergence of a new class of crony capitalists and to ensure that reconstruction efforts are not undermined by self-serving interests, establishing a clearer separation between governmental roles and private economic ventures. The prohibition seeks to foster an environment of greater integrity and public trust in the new economic landscape.
