Draft internal regulations for Syria's People's Council have drawn sharp criticism for their potential to reinforce presidential dominance and limit the independent authority of lawmakers. The proposed rules are seen as replicating the traditional architecture of the legislative institution, rather than fostering a more autonomous body. Indeed, the draft internal regulations attempt to replicate the traditional architecture of the legislative institution while simultaneously reinforcing presidential dominance and constraining the independent authority of lawmakers, critics contend. These proposed amendments, they argue, are not merely technical adjustments but foundational requirements necessary for establishing an independent, modern, and effective parliament in Syria. The proposed amendments are not mere technical refinements; rather, they are presented as foundational requirements for establishing an independent, modern, and effective parliament.
Presidential Authority and Agenda Control
In extraordinary sessions, the draft regulations grant the President unilateral control over the agenda. This unilateral control over the agenda in extraordinary sessions represents a significant concentration of power. Proposed revisions advocate linking the agenda strictly to the initial request for such sessions, aiming to prevent mission creep. Critics contend that the power to request constitutional interpretations should require either a majority vote or a collective petition by deputies, rather than remaining an exclusive presidential privilege. Allowing the President to convene any committee enables top-down control over legislative priorities; such authority, they argue, should rest solely with each committee’s bureau to ensure greater autonomy. The Council Bureau’s monopoly over setting session agendas is seen as marginalizing independent lawmakers and reducing the assembly floor to a conduit for government-sponsored bills. This centralized control over the agenda effectively stifles independent legislative initiatives. Granting the President near-absolute discretion to permit floor interventions risks silencing dissenting voices within the council, further curtailing open debate. Oversight of parliamentary questions, according to the criticisms, should be entrusted to a dedicated committee rather than the President, ensuring impartiality and thoroughness. The Secretariat General must not remain subordinate to the President; placing it under the authority of the Council Bureau would preserve its neutrality and operational independence. This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer.
Legislative and Oversight Weaknesses
The draft regulations lack a binding legal definition for conflicts of interest, instead addressing the principle in vague, rhetorical language that imposes no enforceable obligation. This absence of a clear, enforceable definition leaves a significant loophole. Critics argue that resolving jurisdictional disputes between committees through the Council Bureau risks steering sensitive bills toward politically favorable committees, undermining the integrity of the legislative process. They propose a more neutral mechanism, referring such disputes first to the Constitutional Affairs Committee and then to the general assembly, to ensure unbiased resolution. Granting the Bureau exclusive authority to select parliamentary delegations without clear criteria is seen as risking the institutionalization of patronage, potentially rewarding loyalty over merit.
A merger of the Law Quality Committee into the Constitutional Affairs Committee is proposed to streamline legal review and eliminate bureaucratic overlap, enhancing efficiency. Concerns have been raised over Article 85, which allows the required quorum to drop to one-third after two hours and disregards member departures when assessing session validity. This provision, critics argue, could enable critical legislation to pass with minimal attendance, compromising legitimacy. To restore balance and reaffirm deputies' legislative roles, it is suggested that regular sessions be dedicated to proposals introduced by them, fostering a more proactive legislative body. A more equitable system for speaking rights, it is argued, would rely on pre-registration and equal time allocation, ensuring all voices have an opportunity to be heard.
Disciplinary measures imposed by the President, according to critics, should be subject to appeal before the general assembly, providing a key check on executive power. Allowing the deletion of phrases from official transcripts is viewed as compromising historical accuracy and enabling retroactive censorship of deputies’ expressed opinions, thereby undermining transparency and accountability. The draft prioritizes public voting by a show of hands over electronic voting, which critics contend should be the default method to shield lawmakers from political pressure and ensure greater independence in their decisions.
Parliamentary Structure and Gaps
The practice of opening parliamentary sessions with Quranic recitations reportedly raises constitutional and civic concerns within the proposed regulations, touching upon the secular nature of the state. Critics propose granting members the right to present questions directly to the assembly, enhancing their oversight capabilities. To prevent delays in lifting immunity, referrals should automatically take effect after forty-eight hours, according to the criticisms, ensuring timely justice. Introducing a mechanism to propose a vote of no confidence in the Council President is also deemed essential, providing a vital tool for accountability within the legislative body. Requiring financial disclosures from deputies would further strengthen transparency and deter illicit enrichment, critics suggest, promoting ethical conduct. The absence of a dedicated Foreign Relations Committee raises questions about parliament’s role in foreign policy, potentially marginalizing its input on international affairs. Failing to grant the Constitutional Affairs Committee explicit jurisdiction over judicial legislation leaves a significant gap in oversight, potentially allowing judicial reforms to proceed without adequate parliamentary scrutiny. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story.
